– NATO...Are Its Final Days Just Ahead

France's Strategic Posture: NATO Reintegration and European Defense
Judah Grunstein

PARIS -- Since the time of Gen. De Gaulle, France's posture towards the United States can be summed up in the familiar expression, "Friend, ally, non-aligned." A source of French pride and American distrust, the formula has haunted France's historically stormy relationship with NATO, and served as the geopolitical expression of l'exception française, France's cultural identity of exceptionalism. It took on added significance since the emergence of the European Union, of which France was and remains a driving force. The need to balance its two principle relationships -- one a strategic alliance with political implications, the other a political project with strategic implications -- while still maintaining its autonomy to act in its own interests when necessary can be found at the heart of the French foreign policy debate. While no one seriously advocates one pole of the spectrum to the exclusion of the other, the eternal question remains the right dose of each. Which explains why President Sarkozy's proposal to formally reintegrate into the NATO command structure has been the subject of such scrutiny, discussion and debate.

The proposal is not unprecedented. François Mitterand broached the subject back in 1991. Most recently, in 1996, Jacques Chirac raised the possibility of a French reintegration in return for the southern regional command being placed under French officers. It's also a relatively formal step at this point, in the sense that France is already an active participant and contributor to the alliance. According to Jean-Pierre Maulny of the Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégique, France has progressively reintegrated into NATO since the end of the Cold War in 1989. "We're 90 percent in it," he explained. "There's just the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), the Nuclear Planning Group, and the Integrated Military Command (IMC) that we're still not a part of." Militarily, Maulny said, the reintegration won't change anything. But he, like many others, characterized the proposal to return to the DPC and IMC as an "obvious gesture towards the United States." It's that symbollism that has invested the move with a political significance that in many ways exceeds its concrete impact.

Taken together with Sarkozy's decision to increase France's troop contribution to the NATO operation in Afghanistan, as well as the hardening French line on Iran, the proposal has been attacked, primarily on the left, as an alignment with America. Sen. Didier Boulaud resigned his seat on the Livre Blanc commission to protest a series of executive decisions (including the Afghanistan deployment) that, he believed, undermined the commission's independence. He called the reintegration of NATO an alignment with President Bush and his failed policies, and above all questioned its timing. "We could have waited a bit, if only to see how the four years to come turn out under a new American president, a new administration, to have some perspective," he argued. "But instead, we're rushing to the side of an outgoing administration the likes of which everyone hopes we won't see again. There was no urgency."

But according to Eric Chevallier, special advisor to Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, by becoming fully implicated in the command structure, France will be able to weigh more heavily on the alliance's decisions -- without sacrificing its autonomy, due to the changing nature of the alliance. "What happened in Bucharest with Ukraine and Georgia," said Chevallier, "was the manifestation of six Europeans (and notably the founders of Europe) who didn't say no just to oppose the U.S. They said, 'If you want us to be full partners in the alliance, we have to say what we think.' And if the alliance is progressively able to have that kind of fluid debate, that means it's more balanced."

The move can also be understood as a trust-building measure. Sarkozy has made no secret of his desire not only to return the French-American relationship to its pre-Iraq footing, but to improve on even that. "Trust Europe," he delared in his address to the U.S. Congress last November, but he might just as well have left it at, Trust France. "We want to be true partners," continued Chevallier. "To be true partners, we have to listen to each other. But to listen to each other, we need two things. We have to trust each other. And secondly, we have to be fully implicated. Because we can't have one foot inside and one foot outside and expect to discuss things as equals."

Most importantly, though, Sarkozy has conditioned the reintegration of the NATO command structure on guarantees for the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the EU defense component that has become central to France's vision of European construction. As Chevallier put it, "Yes to a perspective of a complete reintegration of the combined NATO command structures, but at the same time, yes, also, in a complementary and articulated fashion to a recognition of the imperative for progress on ESDP." To those who dismiss the condition as cosmetic window dressing, Chevallier was adamant. "What's very clear is that President Sarkozy and the foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, are firmly attached to the fact that it not be cosmetic, but real."

Which essentially means a promise from America and the more Atlanticist European countries not to interfere with ESDP's natural evolution, an evolution that becomes less abstract and more concrete with each new EU force that deploys. "We need two major instruments for this pre-teenager to become an adult," explained Michel Miraillet, director of the Defense Ministry's Strategic Affairs Directorate. "An operational planning capacity and an operational command center in Brussels." That, according to Yves Boyer, deputy director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, represents "breaking the monopoly of SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe]," and helps explain America's historic hostility to the idea.

Sarkozy is counting on a shift in that attitude, and if the moment seems ripe for one, it's partly because circumstances have demonstrated the practicality of an independent EU defense capacity. As Miraillet pointed out, military interventions come wrapped in political context. In both Lebanon and Chad, the EU was able to deploy in places that NATO can't, whether due to its perceived American affiliation or lack of experience in the theater of operations. Those deployments, meanwhile, have demonstrated to France's European partners the need for planning and command capacity. "We're really calm about ESDP, because we're pragmatic," said Miraillet. "For the first time, we're not the dogmatic ones. It's the operational need that's decisive."

France's insistence on ESDP can only be understood in the context of its vision for Europe. Unlike some European countries, both large and small, who are satisfied with a prosperous common market that largely outsources its defense capacity to the United States, France (or at the very least its political elites) has long advocated for a "Europe puissance." The term translates literally to European power, but connotes more than just influence. It connotes the ability to make its weight felt as a strategic actor. "And it's hard to picture a strategic actor not disposing of the military resources that permit him to act," said Yves Boyer, who also acknowledged the difficulties ESDP faces. "It's a vision that we have, but we don't really know how to transcribe into a political, strategic, and organizational reality. At the same time, if we don't do it, what capacity will Europe have to affirm its interests and defend them?"

There's a feeling here that the wind might be turning for ESDP, though. The EUFOR mission currently deploying on Chad's border with Darfur includes contingents from Ireland and Poland, countries that until recently were hostile to European defense. President Bush at the recent NATO summit in Bucharest, as well as America's NATO ambassador in two addresses, have publicly supported its development. Sarkozy has made progress on ESDP one of the major priorities of his agenda for France's EU presidency, which begins in July. But even if Great Britain finds itself increasingly isolated in its opposition to ESDP, everyone acknowledges that the political climate is delicate. Sarkozy will still have to tread lightly in order to avoid inflaming public opinion in Great Britain, which will be voting soon on the all-important Treaty of Lisbon.

Not everyone is convinced, though, that Sarkozy's gambit will pay off. "In terms of influence, I'm afraid it won't change anything," said Jean-Pierre Maulny. "Today, the British aren't in good shape financially. Neither is France. I don't see how we're going to have more influence, while the Europeans continue to weigh less and less compared to the Americans." He also questioned whether Sarkozy has gone too far in his public declarations to be able to back out should his conditions on ESDP not be met. Boyer echoed his thoughts with regards to influence, saying, "I don't think the French can obtain a level of influence greater to what we have already, which isn't very great."

The risk also remains that even if the U.S. lifts its objections, ESDP still won't go anywhere, for reasons that have more to do with the European Union than with NATO. Hubert Védrine, France's foreign minister during the Jospin government, explained that Europe still hasn't answered the fundamental question of whether or not it actually wants to become a power. "One part of the elite says, 'Yes, Europe must become a power, otherwise we won't be able to defend our interests.' Another part of the elite says, 'We don't want to become a classic power, we're only going to use soft power.' Norms and competition, for instance. So there's one debate. And the public at large doesn't really want to become a power. They want to create a great big 'Switzerland.' That hasn't been settled yet."

Finally, there's the risk that a formal reintegration of the NATO command, by creating the perception -- whether true or false -- that France has aligned itself with the American line, will damage France's image abroad. Jean-Pierre Maulny mentioned the Arab world and Latin America as particularly sensitive audiences. Didier Boulaud included regional powers, such as India, with a historical tradition of non-alignment. "France had a kind of originality in its vision," he said, "which, nevertheless, never kept NATO from acting." On the other hand, as Védrine pointed out, the move could pay off in terms of France's image among the more American-aligned countries of Eastern Europe, most notably Poland.

For the time being, though, nothing has been formally concluded and, according to Sarkozy, nothing will be decided before next year's 60th anniversary NATO summit co-hosted by France and Germany. So whether reintegration will strengthen or weaken France's influence, broaden or narrow its autonomy, or improve or damage its image remains speculation and conjecture. That doesn't mean Sarkozy's proposal doesn't represent a significant shift. But that shift might go deeper than just the historical Atlanticist-European tension that characterized the Fifth Republic.

"It really looks like Nicolas Sarkozy wants to free himself from that political line," said Védrine, "because he talks all the time about the family of the West. That's new in France's vocabulary. He says that France is an element of the family of the West. That can have consequences down the line, on NATO, on what we do or don't do in the Middle East, what we do or don't do in Iran and Afghanistan. So what's very original in this moment 2008 is not so much the evolution of the context, because if we talk about China, Russia or the Arab world or elsewhere, it's not very different from what I could have said two years ago or two years from now. What's different is Sarkozy."

When asked whether NATO reintegration didn't represent the suggestion that France renounce its cultural identity based on l'exception française and become a country like any other, Michel Miraillet replied, "The French exception is one of the great myths of the Fifth Republic. Is that still valid today?" Before adding, "This presidency is going to be a real evolution."

Tomorrow's installment will discuss France's principle strategic priorities, in terms of potential threats and regions of focus, and how they are evolving.

Judah Grunstein is an American journalist based in Paris, and a World Politics Review associate editor.